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I’m sure we are all moved by the profound and unique signification of 
commencement exercises at Yale Law School.  At other, lesser law schools, 
commencement marks the successful completion of a program in legal 
education.  But at Yale, commencement means just that – a start, a beginning.  
Having earned your Juris Doctorate from Yale, the time has come for you finally 
to commence learning real law. 
Well, today I’d like to offer you an apology for the distinctive brand of 
legal education you received here.  Of course I mean apology not as in a 
contrite acknowledgment of fault, but apology as in a justification of a position 
of political and moral dispute. 
Now in truth, I think our pedagogy at Yale Law School is not nearly so 
alienated from the practice of law as it is sometimes, comically depicted.  But it 
is, I concede, emphatically opposed to the conventional view that learning law 
means learning a body of formal rules.  So I want to explain why, to my mind 
at least, a conventional legal education of that sort would almost certainly have 
made you a bad lawyer –in multiple senses – and why the approach we use 
instead will, at least hopefully, make you a good one. 
Do you know what this is? Yes, it’s a baby chick. But do you know its 
gender?  Of course, not. But you would if you were a professional chick sexer. 
In the poultry industry, it is very important to separate out male and 
female chicks almost immediately after birth: the males are less valuable – they 
can’t lay eggs and their meat isn’t nearly so tender – and they end up 
competing with the female chicks for food.  So you need to pick the males out 
and get rid of them.  This job falls to the professionally trained chick sexer, who 
turning the chicks over gently in his or her hand is able to sort out male from 
female at a rate of 1,000 per hour and at an accuracy rate of 99%. 
What makes this feat so astonishing, though, is that there just isn’t any 
readily discernable, or at least articulable, difference in the anatomy of 
newborn chicks.  All zoologists agree that this is so.  If you ask a professionally 
trained chick sexer what he is looking for, don’t expect a satisfying answer.  
Either he’ll confabulate, telling you some fantastic and silly story about the 
inability of the male chick to look him straight in the eye. Or more candidly, 
he’ll just shrug his shoulders. 
But while the nature of the chicksexer’s skill may be inexplicable, how he 
acquired it isn’t.  To become chicksexers, individuals go off for an extended 
period of study with a chick sexing grandmaster.  He doesn’t give lectures or 
assign texts.  Instead he exposes his pupils to slides– “male,” “female,” “male,” 
“male,” “female,” “female,” “male” – continuing on in this way until the students 
acquire the same special power to intuitively perceive the gender of a newborn 
chick, even without being able to cogently explain how. 
What in the world does this have to do with law, you are asking yourself 
of a professor’s lecture, once again.  Well, what I want to suggest is that what’s 
going on in the chick-sexing profession is the very same thing that goes on in 
the legal profession.  The formal doctrines and rules that make up the law – 
unconscionability, proximate causation, character propensity, unreasonable 
restraints of trade – are just as fuzzy and indeterminate as the genetalia of day-
old chicks.  And yet just as the trained chick sexer can accurately distinguish 
female from male, so the trained lawyer can accurately distinguish good 
decision from bad, persuasive argument from weak.  Ask the lawyer for an 
explanation, and in his case too you’ll get nothing but confabulation – “plain 
meaning,” “congressional intent,” “efficiency” – or what have you.   
In addition, the lawyer attains her skill – to recognize what she can’t 
cogently explain – in much the same way that the chick sexer does: through 
exposure to a professional slideshow, this one conducted by law grandmasters, 
including law professors but also other socialized lawyers, who authoritatively 
certify what count as good and bad decisions, sound and unsound arguments, 
thereby inculcating in students and young practitioners the power of intuitive 
perception distinctive of the legal craft. 
Now, by this point in my argument, you’ll likely recognize that my 
analogy between legal reasoning with chick sexing is just a colorful rehearsing 
of legal realism.  As developed at Yale Law School in the 1920s and 1930s, legal 
realism was less interested to demonstrate that legal rules are formally 
indeterminate than to explain how lawyers nonetheless form such uniform and 
predictable understandings of what those rules entail.  Llewellyn attributed 
this ability to what he called “situation sense,” an intuitive perceptive faculty 
born of immersion in professional and cultural norms – the slide show of law.  
Contemporary social psychologists use the concepts of pattern recognition and 
prototypical reasoning to describe the same cognitive processes – which are 
pervasive in all fields and facets of life, not just law and the poultry industry. 
Well, if you accept this central insight of legal realism, as I do, then you 
will readily understand that effective legal training has very little to do with 
learning the mass and detail of formal legal rules.  Instead, it has everything to 
do with acquiring situation sense.  
You’ll also see that being an effective advocate requires an ability to 
arouse the situation sense of other lawyers, including judges. Those who 
believe that making convincing arguments consists in knowing formal rules are 
professionally autistic. They can’t make arguments that engage the emotional 
motivations of those they are trying to persuade.  Only those who understand 
the role of situation sense, who are acquainted with the norms that construct 
it, are poised to explain, to predict, and through strategic framing and 
advocacy, to influence legal decisionmakers. 
So to make you good lawyers we at Yale impart not “rule knowledge” but 
situation sense.  This is part of my apology for our distinctive pedagogy. 
But it is only part.  There’s another, which is more complicated and 
which is concerned with making you good rather than bad lawyers in a 
somewhat different sense. 
I’m sure you will all have immediately recognize one difference between 
the situation sense of chicksexers and situation sense of lawyers.  The quality 
of intuitive perceptions of any individual chicksexer can be externally validated: 
ultimately we can test whether he is able accurately to distinguish male and 
female.  But we can’t externally validate the situation sense of lawyers.  The 
only test of whether some lawyer has reliable situation sense is to see whether 
other lawyers (including decisionmakers) agree with her perceptions of how 
society’s rules should be applied.   
Now understand, the lack of external validation doesn’t mean that good 
lawyering, as a psychological matter, can’t be said to involve the same faculty 
of tacit reasoning, or intuitive perception, that good chick-sexing does.  But it 
does mean that the content of the lawyers situation sense will be inevitably be 
more contingent and dynamic: our professional norms – and in turn the law 
itself – will evolve in response to the evaluations we ourselves make of the 
decisions and actions of one another. 
As a result, there is an element of moral agency in good lawyering that 
has no analog in good chick sexing.  When I as a lawyer exercise professional 
judgment, when I perform my professional responsibilities, I affirm the 
authority and extend the vitality of the norms that construct our professional 
situation sense.  Now granted, it would be absurd to assert that every decision 
a lawyer makes meaningfully influences professional understandings, much 
less that any individual lawyer always has the power to point those 
understandings in a either a just or an unjust direction.  But it would be 
equally naïve to deny that the decisions of certain individual lawyers, on 
certain critical occasions, can have that effect. 
 A little over a decade ago, a brilliant 25 year-old was standing where you 
are.  Less than a decade later, after serving as a Supreme Court Law Clerk and 
as professor at an elite law school, he found himself serving as Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel.  At the behest of 
White House lawyers who were battling internal opposition from career military 
officers and lawyers, he wrote a legal memorandum which construed the law to 
permit the use of interrogation techniques that the U.S. had for decades 
understood to be banned by the Geneva Convention.  Because of the 
institutional stature and formal authority of the OLC within the Executive 
Branch; because of the function the memo was intended to play in resolving a 
debate among other governmental officials of immense authority; and because 
of the impact of 9-11 in provoking societal reconsideration of the relationship 
between civil liberties and national security, this Yale-trained lawyer did have 
every reason to believe that his memo, all on its own, would have a profound 
and shaping impact on the professional and cultural understandings that are 
our law.  Yet he pretended this wasn’t so.  When asked by an appalled career 
military intelligence officer whether the memo meant the President could order 
torture, he answered, “Yes, but I’m not talking policy. I’m talking law here.” 
The analysis reflected in the so-called Torture Memo did not, in fact, 
become part of our professional and cultural understandings, our situation 
sense.  But I think a large part of the credit for that belongs to another 
individual lawyer, who as a 20-something also stood where you now are about 
a decade and a half ago.  He too clerked for a Supreme Court Justice and then 
served on the faculty of a major U.S. law school. In 2003 he took over as head 
of the Office of Legal Counsel.  And to the shock of his patrons, he immediately 
issued a directive advising the military intelligence services that they couldn’t 
rely on the so-called Torture Memo.  This was well before the Abu Ghraib 
prisoner abuse scandal came to light, at a time when high-ranking political 
appointees in the Justice Department and Pentagon were continuing to place 
decisive reliance on the Torture Memo.  As a result, this lawyer had every 
reason to believe the Memo’s understanding of the law would persist, and that 
it would pervade and shape the shared professional and cultural 
understandings of lawyers, unless he as a lawyer took responsibility for 
repudiating it. So he did.  
This lawyer, Jack Goldsmith, was ultimately pushed out of OLC and is 
now languishing at an obscure law school in Cambridge, Massachusetts. When 
he got there, by the way, a portion of that institution's faculty, unaware of the 
role he had played in overturning the Torture Memo, and later in temporarily 
suspending the then still-secret NSA warrantless domestic surveillance policy, 
refused to even acknowledge him in the halls. Well, some of the lawyers trained 
at that school also played a sad role in the Torture Memo. Now that Goldsmith 
is there, I suspect it's much less likely that any of its future graduates will try, 
in cowardly fashion, to evade moral responsibility for their actions by insisting 
that law is nothing but a set of formally binding rules. And I have hope that as 
a result of his actions, it's much less likely any of you ever will either. 
This was my last chance to teach you some law, Yale style.  These were 
my final two slides: one bad lawyer, one good.  What made the bad one bad 
wasn’t that he knew “less law.”  It was that he, unlike the good lawyer, refused 
to take moral responsibility when he found himself in a position where his 
individual actions as a lawyer were likely to have a decisive role in shaping our 
profession’s situation sense, and thus in shaping the law itself. 
Because you today are standing where these two lawyers stood, because 
you are standing where number members of Congress, Justices of the Supreme 
Court, and Presidents of the United States have all stood too, I feel petty 
certain that a number of you too will be in that position some day.  If you are, 
how good a lawyer you are won’t be determined by how many rules you’ve 
learned; it will turn on how good a person you are.  My apology for not teaching 
you more “law” is that I thought it was much more urgent to try to teach you 
that. 
